According to one understanding of the problem of dirty hands, every case of dirty hands is an instance of moral conflict, but not every instance of moral conflict is a case of dirty hands. So, what sets the two apart? The dirty hands literature has offered widely different answers to this question but there has been relatively little discussion about their relative merits as well as challenges. In this paper I evaluate these different accounts by making clear which understanding of (...) concept distinctness underlies them and which of them is, ultimately, the most plausible one in the case of dirty hands and ordinary moral conflict. In order to do so, I will borrow from the terminology employed in recent debates in the philosophy of evil which have tackled a similar problem to the one at hand, i.e. defining what sets evil apart from ordinary wrongdoing. Here it has been argued that concepts could be distinct in three ways: they can have a quantitative difference, a strong qualitative or a moderate qualitative difference. I conclude that the most convincing definition of dirty hands draws a moderate qualitative distinction between ordinary moral conflict according to which dirty hands are those moral conflicts that involve a serious violation or betrayal of a core moral value. (shrink)

The problem of dirty hands is, roughly speaking, concerned with situations in which an agent is faced with a choice between two evils so that, no matter what they do, they will have to violate something of important moral value. Theorists have been primarily concerned with dirty hands choices arising in politics because they are thought to be particularly frequent and pressing in this sphere. Much of the subsequent discussion in the literature has focused on the impact that such choices (...) have on a well-functioning democracy and how, if at all, we can ensure that a politician dirtying their hands does not undermine core democratic values and processes. A particular concern has been whether dirty-handed politicians ought to publicly reveal their actions after the fact and whether they should be held accountable through some form of punishment. The first aim of this paper is to point out that the focus on what is required in the wake of a dirty-handed decision, based on the need to protect the democratic system ought to be balanced with a genuine concern for reparative justice and what is owed to the victims of dirty hands. In the second part of this paper, I then examine the suitability of one common way in which perpetrators partly repair the damage they have done to victims, namely apologizing, in the dirty hands context. (shrink)

This paper argues that the dirty hands literature has overlooked a crucial distinction in neglecting to discuss explicitly the issue of, what I call, symmetry. This is the question of whether, once we are confronted with a dirty hands situation, we could emerge with our hands clean depending on the action we choose. A position that argues that we can keep our hands clean I call “asymmetrical” and one that says that we will get our hands dirty no matter what (...) we do I call “symmetrical”. Not acknowledging this distinction is a problem because, firstly, it adds to the existing confusions about how best to define what dirty hands are. Secondly, it prevents the concept of dirty hands from being applied properly to other contexts such as, for example, the responsibility and accountability of politicians. I argue that we have good reason to favour a symmetrical understanding because it gives a more convincing account of what makes an action dirty and because it more accurately captures our complex moral decision-making when faced with dirty hands situations. The paper concludes by outlining possible implications that the distinction between the symmetry view and the asymmetry view has on wider debates surrounding the problem of dirty hands. (shrink)

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential (...) that it represents its effect. (shrink)

This paper considers three arguments by David Shugarman and Maureen Ramsay for why dirty hands cannot be democratic. The first argues that it is contradictory, in principle, to use undemocratic means to pursue democratic ends. There is a conceptual connection between means and ends such that getting one’s hands dirty is incompatible with acting in accordance with democratic ends. The second claims that using dirty-handed means, in practice, will undermine democracy more than it promotes it and therefore cannot be justified. (...) The final criticism states that politicians with dirty hands are a sign that politics is no longer meeting the criteria necessary to be called democratic. The paper shows that such rejections of democratic dirty hands are based on misunderstandings of the nature of dirty hands and democratic politics. (shrink)

Through a wide-ranging international collection of papers, this volume provides theoretical and historical insights into the development and application of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology and offers detailed examples of research into social phenomena from these standpoints. All the articles in this volume join together to testify to the enormous efficacy and potential of both phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology.

Frederick II neither tolerated the Schwenckfeldians in Silesia as an independent denomination nor recognized them, but, rather from a legal basis demanded that they be incorporated into the Lutheran Church. With the acknowledgement of the Schwenckfeldian movement as an independant denomination, he would have gone beyond article VII of the Instrumenta Pacis Osnabrigense, jeopardizing future peace negotiations with the House of Habsburg. However, he did promise the Schwenckfeldians that the government would respect their personal faith and conscience and would be (...) willing to protect them from attack, though limited by the reason of state which would be endangered if the fundamental articles of the Christian religion were openly denied. For if these were negated one could not discount the possibility that not only Maria Theresea but also the Protestant and Catholic subjects would take offence, causing tension and diminishing the prosperity of the State. The philosopher of Sanssouci himself held freedom of faith and conscience highly, but felt it had to be subordinate to the welfare of the state. The actual reason for he gave this assurance to the Schwenckfeldians though, was not merely to give his subjects a relative amount of freedom, but, more important, to encourage further immigration into his lands. Frederick II, who saw himself as the first servant of his state, thereby hoped to raise the density of population in relatively depopulated areas, to promote manufacturing and trade, and with it the prosperity of the state. The positive impulse for the attitude of Frederic II against the Schwenckfeldians was therefore in the last analysis based on political motives. His concession of freedom of faith and conscience to the Schwenckfeldians was in principle possible only because he had granted such freedom to all his Silesian subjects - who had to belong to one of the three confessions recognized by the Peace of Westphalia- on the condition that they would not deny reverence to God or subservience to the State. In comparison to the intolerant attitude of many contemporary states which gave their subjects no liberty of faith or conscience, the position which the state of Frederic II hat taken vis-a-vis the Schwenckfeldians in Silesia therefore signifies a great step forward. This position, however, was considerably less than the religious freedom enjoyed by those Schwenckfeldians who emigrated to Pennsylvania. (shrink)

The amount of data available to healthcare practitioners is growing, and the rapid increase in available patient data is becoming a problem for healthcare practitioners, as they are often unable to fully survey and process the data relevant for the treatment or care of a patient. Consequently, there are currently several efforts to develop systems that can aid healthcare practitioners with reading and processing patient data and, in this way, provide them with a better foundation for decision-making about the treatment (...) and care of patients. There are also efforts to develop algorithms that provide suggestions for such decisions. However, the development of these systems and algorithms raises several concerns related to the privacy of patients, the patient–practitioner relationship, and the autonomy of healthcare practitioners. The aim of this article is to provide a foundation for understanding the ethical challenges related to the development of a specific form of data-processing systems, namely clinical algorithms. (shrink)

The reintroduction of Aristotle's Analytics to the Latin West—in particular, the reintroduction of the Posterior Analytics—forever altered the course of medieval epistemological discussions. Although the Analytics fell decidedly from grace in later centuries, the sophisticated account of human cognition developed in the Posterior Analytics appealed so strongly to thirteenth-century European scholars that it became one of the two central theories of knowledge advocated in the later Middle Ages. Robert Grosseteste's 'Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libro', written in the 1220s, is most (...) likely the first complete Latin commentary on the Posterior Analytics. As the thirteenth century wore on, Aristotle’s account of human cognition was generally set in opposition to the Augustinian-influenced theory of divine illumination that was de rigueur in the early thirteenth century. Although common consensus holds that this pattern of opposition was set already in Grosseteste’s CPA, I argue that the story of the Posterior Analytics’s early reception is, in fact, quite different. In particular, I maintain that, rather than seeing himself as forced to choose between his earlier theory of divine illumination and the “new” Aristotelian epistemology, Grosseteste is perfectly content to blend and bring together the diverse elements of these systems and to present a consciously synthetic rather than adversarial picture of these differing accounts of human cognition. (shrink)

The global segmentation of production and distribution has resulted in highly complex global value chains where vertical and horizontal dynamics are equally important in determining working conditions and providing points of leverage for labour. Borrowing notions of multi-level governance, we propose an analytical framework for describing and explaining success and failure of labour agency when attempting to improve working conditions along GVCs. Our starting point is that the high complexity of GVCs and the absence of a global overarching authority have (...) been balanced by the emergence of governance mechanisms of different forms and at different levels. An assessment of these mechanisms, which emphasize process over institutions, reveals how different types of interactions and interdependencies along GVCs impact on labour’s use of power. We argue that, in order to fully situate labour agency within governance debates, any future research agenda needs to be driven by micro-level bottom-up approaches. (shrink)

Towards the end of Beyond Reduction Horst hypothesizes that ‘it is a general design principle of the cognitive architecture of humans that the mind possesses multiple models for understanding and interacting practically with different aspects of the world’. The suggestion is made following a discussion of recent research in cognitive science. According to Horst, the hypothesis is also consistent with what recent non-reductionist tendencies in the philosophy of science teach us. Taken together, Horst claims these two sets (...) of evidence motivate a new post-reductionist approach to the philosophy of mind. After outlining the route Horst takes to reach this claim, I shall raise a worry I have about the claim and the route taken to it.Beyond Reduction is in three parts. Part one frames the debate. In Chapter 1 Horst notes how naturalism is a view to which nearly all philosophers of mind, some of whom hold quite disparate views, would subscribe. He formulates a schema for naturalism that he thinks most would accept: ‘naturalism about domain D is the view that all features of D are to be accommodated within the framework of nature as it is understood by the natural sciences’. Horst acknowledges that the schema under-describes matters. The notion of ‘accommodation’ may be understood as involving either explanation or metaphysical determination; it is also unclear how we are to understand ‘the …. (shrink)

Are empirical theories empirically testable? In this article Theoretische Begriffe und die Prüfbarkeit von Theorien V. Gadenne comes to the conclusion that theories are testable. On this basis he criticizes the non-statement view which asserts the contrary. It is shown that this criticism, however, is erroneous.

Increasingly, it is accepted wisdom for agricultural scientists to get feedback from indigenous peoples—peasants—about new improved seeds and biotechnologies before their official release from the experiment station. What is not yet accepted wisdom is the importance of cognitive science to research on farmer decision making, especially of the type “Why don't they adopt.” In this paper, the impact of the cognitive revolution on models of farmer decision making is described, and decision making models before and after the cognitive revolution are (...) contrasted. An example of a decision model after the cognitive revolution is given by the Malawi farmer's decision whether to use chemical fertilizers or organic fertilizers or both. Results of testing the model show that in Malawi, smallholders' lack of capital and credit are more important factors constraining use of chemical fertilizers than are indigenous beliefs in organic fertilizers or fears of a future dependency on chemicals. (shrink)

The ontological turn in the humanities and social sciences has prompted some scholars of education to shift their focus of inquiry away from questions of epistemology (i.e., knowledge) to metaphysical matters related to being and the nature of existence. In this paper, I turn to ontology and make an argument for integrating and explicitly teaching theories of immanence in teacher education courses. I argue that integrating and explicitly teaching theories of immanence in teacher education courses can radically reorient students’ thinking, (...) being, and doing, which can fundamentally change how they are able to see, perceive, and make sense of events that unfold in their classrooms. Using vignettes of two encounters at an Italian preschool, I think with theory (Jackson and Mazzei 2012; St. Pierre, 2008, Ringrose and Renolds 2014) to demonstrate how philosophies of immanence reorient thought and produce “a lively new ontology” in which “the world’s radical aliveness comes to light” (Barad 2007, p. 33). The theoretical concepts I use include political theorist Jane Bennett’s (2010) concept of thing power, along with physicist Karen Barad’s (2007) concepts of entanglement and intra-action. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers (...) has been the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). CTM was first articulated by Hilary Putnam (1960, 1961), but finds perhaps its most consistent and enduring advocate in Jerry Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994). It is this theory, and not any broader interpretations of what it would be for the mind to be a computer, that I wish to address in this paper. What I shall argue here is that the notion of symbolic representation employed by CTM is fundamentally unsuited to providing an explanation of the intentionality of mental states (a major goal of CTM), and that this result undercuts a second major goal of CTM, sometimes refered to as the vindication of intentional psychology. This line of argument is related to the discussions of derived intentionality by Searle (1980, 1983, 1984) and Sayre (1986, 1987). But whereas those discussions seem to be concerned with the causal dependence of familiar sorts of symbolic representation upon meaning-bestowing acts, my claim is rather that there is not one but several notions of meaning to be had, and that the notions that are applicable to symbols are conceptually dependent upon the notion that is applicable to mental states in the fashion that Aristotle refered to as paronymy. That is, an analysis of the notions of meaning applicable to symbols reveals that they contain presuppositions about meaningful mental states, much as Aristotle's analysis of the sense of healthy that is applied to foods reveals that it means conducive to having a healthy body, and hence any attempt to explain mental semantics in terms of the semantics of symbols is doomed to circularity and regress. I shall argue, however, that this does not have the consequence that computationalism is bankrupt as a paradigm for cognitive science, as it is possible to reconstruct CTM in a fashion that avoids these difficulties and makes it a viable research framework for psychology, albeit at the cost of losing its claims to explain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psychology. I have argued elsewhere (Horst, 1996) that local special sciences such as psychology do not require vindication in the form of demonstrating their reducibility to more fundamental theories, and hence failure to make good on these philosophical promises need not compromise the broad range of work in empirical cognitive science motivated by the computer paradigm in ways that do not depend on these problematic treatments of symbols. (shrink)

In 2016, the international community, in reaction to the growing number of ‘tragedies’ occurring as people attempted to move across borders, met to discuss large movements of refugees and migrants. The outcome of this meeting was an agreement to negotiate two Global Compacts, one on refugees and one on migrants, with the aim of facilitating ‘orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people’. This article explores how responsibility in the Global Compact on Migrant is expressive of a changed (...) way of ‘doing’ migration. The language of ‘responsibility’ raises questions about how the international community views international migration and, by extension, prepares the ground for policy and practice on international migration. Taking a genealogical, jurisprudential approach, we follow the logic which brings migration, development and human rights language together to construct a new subjectivity: that of the ‘responsible’ migrant. The migrant human will be a rights-bearer because they will contribute to development in particular gendered ways. We argue that assuming a narrow understanding of responsibility misses expressive dynamics in the normalizing of international migration within a new framing to inform international law making. (shrink)

This article takes the role of provocateur to ‘queer(y)’ the rules of intelligibility surrounding new schooling accountabilities. Butler’s work is seldom used outside the arena of gender and sexualities research. A ‘queer(y)ing’ methodology is subsequently applied in a context very different to where it is frequently associated. Empirical data from a case study secondary school in Australia are used to contextualise the use of queer theory in thinking differently about new schooling accountabilities and how they can unfold in ways that (...) are unforeseen and unexpected. By applying Butlerian theory in a manner very different to what is commonly expected, the author also destabilises the use of queer theory as well. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the Special Issue and offers an overview of the corpus of work on the topic since the publication of Michael Walzer’s seminal article, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’.

In 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, in Matter of A-B-, attempted to bar victims of non-state actors—such as intimate partners and local gangs—from obtaining asylum in the United States. This article focuses on domestic violence-based asylum claims that made it to the US Circuit Court of Appeals during the Trump administration and the first five months of the Biden administration. My interdisciplinary approach goes beyond analysing the effect that Matter of A-B- has had on the outcomes of cases and asks (...) how judges evaluate the credibility of petitioners, determine whether domestic violence can rise to the level of persecution, and decide whether a government was unwilling or unable to protect the victim. A systematic analysis of 83 appellate level verdicts shows that asylum decisions are fraught with inconsistencies and that many judges lack a sophisticated understanding of domestic violence, credibility, and trauma. (shrink)

In this paper I explicate what it means to see phenomenologically for an able-bodied researcher in the field of disability, and how this seeing yields a non-reductionistic understanding of the phenomenon of disability. My aim is to show how in this context, I, as a human and social scientist can use phenomenological methodology for both collecting and interpreting data. Though phenomenological philosophy can provide the basis of social scientific epistemology, it does not lend itself easily to a single specific or (...) programmatic social scientific methodology. I offer possible ways of using phenomenological theory, methodology and techniques in order to understand the experience of a person with physical disability learning to use a wheelchair. I use data from a clinical encounter between a physical therapist (PT) and an adult with Spinal Cord Injury (SCI) in an inpatient rehabilitation hospital in Midwestern United States in order to flesh out phenomenological seeing. I conclude with implications for qualitative researchers who use phenomenological methods to inform their work. (shrink)

In this paper we offer an exegesis of Hilary Putnam’s classic argument against the brain-in-avat hypothesis offered in his Reason, truth and history (1981). In it, Putnam argues that we cannot be brains in a vat because the semantics of the situation make it incoherent for anyone to wonder whether they are a brain a vat. Putnam’s argument is that in order for ‘I am a brain in a vat’ to be true, the person uttering it would have to be (...) able to refer successfully to those things: the vat, and the envatted brain. Putnam thinks that reference can’t be secured without relevant kinds of causal relations, which, if envatted, the brain would lack, and so, it fails to be able to meaningfully utter ‘I am a brain in a vat’. We consider the implications of Putnam’s arguments for the traditional sceptic. In conclusion, we discuss the role of Putnam’s arguments against the brain in a vat hypothesis in his larger defense of his own internal realism against metaphysical realism. (shrink)

'Wessen Wissen?' ist einerseits eine Frage nach Akteur-innen, Körpern, Materialien und Technologien, die in künstlerischen Produktions- und Wissensprozessen miteinander interagieren. Diese lassen sich als Übersetzungen und Transformationen beschreiben, in denen Künstler-nnen längst nicht mehr die einzigen Subjekte des Wissens sind. Denn in den künstlerischen Praktiken des Entwerfens, Skizzierens, Modellierens, Probens und Experimentierens entfalten Medien und Materialien ihre je eigene agentielle Kraft. 'Wessen Wissen?' ist andererseits eine Frage nach der Heterogenität von Wissensformationen in ihren partikularen und partialen Perspektiven, also nach situated (...) knowledges. Damit wird die Vorstellung einer allgemeingültigen, körperlosen, neutralen Objektivität bestritten. Im Gegenzug nimmt das situierte Wissen der Künste für sich in Anspruch, Erkenntnisse hervorzubringen und zur Verfügung zu stellen. Es steht demnach für verkörperte Kenntnisse, die in das Feld des zugelassenen und legitimen Wissens kritisch intervenieren. (shrink)

In “The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants” (hereinafter “Biden Plan“), then-candidate Joe Biden promised to “reassert America’s commitment to asylum-seekers and refugees.” Three years into his presidency, how far has the Biden Administration come in their efforts to create a more humane asylum system? And has the treatment of unaccompanied minors seen any significant improvements? This article examines the Trump Administration’s attempts to permanently alter the US asylum system. After trying to categorically ban all (...) claims that were based on persecution by “private actors,” the Trump Administration seized on the COVID-19 pandemic as a convenient pretext for taking away even some of the most basic human rights protections that asylum-seekers have enjoyed for generations. This article will argue that the Biden Administration, despite their efforts to restore some basic protections, continues to criminalize and institutionalize many unaccompanied minors. (shrink)

ObjectivesA fitness club may be an important arena to promote regular exercise. However, authors have reported low attendance rates the first months after individuals sign up for membership. It is therefore important to understand the reasons for poor exercise adherence. In this project, we aimed to investigate different psychosocial factors that might increase the likelihood of reporting regular exercise the first year of a fitness club membership, including self-efficacy, motives, social support, life satisfaction, and customer satisfaction.MethodsNew members classified as novice (...) exercisers from 25 multipurpose gyms were followed for 1 year. Data were collected by an electronic survey including background and health factors, self-efficacy, social support, life satisfaction, motives, customer satisfaction, and exercise attendance, and was answered at start-up and after three, six, and 12 months. It is well established in the literature that ≥2 exercise sessions/week improve physical fitness in novice exercisers. Hence, we divided the participants into regular exercise attendance and non-regular exercise attendance in the analysis.ResultsA mixed-effects logistic regression model revealed that the strongest predictor for reporting regular exercise attendance was higher levels of the motive “enjoyment”, followed by self-efficacy “sticking to it” and social support from friends and family.ConclusionIn novice exercisers, regular exercise at three, six, and 12 months was associated with higher scores of the motive “enjoyment,” self-efficacy, and social support compared with non-regular exercise. Our results show that the majority of new fitness club members do not achieve regular exercise behavior. (shrink)

Let $T$ be a theory in a countable fragment of $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_{1},\omega}$ whose extensions in countable fragments have only countably many types. Sacks proves a bounding theorem that generates models of high Scott rank. For this theorem, a tree hierarchy is developed for $T$ that enumerates these extensions. In this paper, we effectively construct a predecessor function for formulas defining types in this tree hierarchy as follows. Let $T_{\gamma}\subseteq T_{\delta}$ with $T_{\gamma}$- and $T_{\delta}$-theories on level $\gamma$ and $\delta$, respectively. Then if (...) $\ulcorner p\urcorner $ is a formula that defines a type for $T_{\delta}$, our predecessor function provides a formula for defining its subtype in $T_{\gamma}$. By constructing this predecessor function, we weaken an assumption for Sacks’s result. (shrink)

Literature on media ethics often tries to close the gap between theory and professional practice. So do three new books by T. Harcup, K. Sanders, and S. L. Bracci and C. G. Christians, of which only Sanders stably positions herself on both sides. She offers outlines of moral philosophical positions where she favors the virtue ethics approach that deals with a person's character and moral abilities. At the same time Sanders analyzes typical conflicts that arise in the everyday work of (...) journalists. Sanders and the more practical oriented former journalist Harcup follow the same fundamental question: "What is journalism for?", but they give different answers. To Harcup, the basic task of journalism lies in the effort to create publicness, i. e., to override barriers of social communication. To Sanders, journalism exists just to tell the truth. Much can be learned from the ‘theorists for contemporary ethics’, such as Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas, who are presented and interpreted in Bracci and Christian's collection, about the relationship between truth and publicness and how this relationship might stimulate the practice of journalism. Journalists' consideration of truth cannot be the necessary prerequisite for the publication of information; instead, the freedom of discourse is the necessary precondition to ensure that the decision whether and to what extent an information is of public interest remains in the hands of the public itself. (shrink)